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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MARION E. TIBBITS and 1 
ROSE WHEELWRIGHT TIBBITS 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
w. I RHUEL 0. OPENSHAW and 
DARLENE 0. OPENSHAW, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Case 
No. 10512 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE SECOND 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT for Weber County, 
Honorable John F. Wahlquist, District Judge 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The defendants and appellants on or about the 31st day 
of July, 1962, entered into a Uniform Real Estate Contract 
wherein they agreed to purchase for the sum of $45 ,000, two 
houses on Lot 7 and 8 in the plaintiffs' and respondents' 
Rainbow Sub-division, Riverdale City, Utah, and a vacant 
piece of property directly behind the two houses, consisting 
of two acres. The two houses are called throughout the trial 
the "white house" and the "brown house". The defendants 
and appellants lived in the white house and rented the brown 
house. 
The uniform real estate contract provided that a deed 
to lot 7 would be given after the December 1, 1962 payment, 
a deed to lot 8 after the April 1, 1963, payment, and a deed 
to the balance of the property when the final payment was 
made. 
Defendants and appellants refused to make the final 
payment, of approximately $3,888.65, which represented the 
balance due on the vacant property. Plaintiffs and respond-
ents, then brought suit claiming breach of contract and sought 
to forecl~se their mortgage upon all three parcels claiming 
said real estate contract was not divisable. Defendants and 
appellants defended on the grounds that the plaintiffs and 
respondents had fraudulently misrepresented the vacant prop-
erty as being suitable for sub-dividing and could be sold as 
separate lots for building purpose, when in fact it was "land 
locked" and did not have access to a dedicated street, except 
for a narrow 20' strip of land. 
Defendants further claimed that the plaintiffs and re-
spondents had fraudently misrepresented the houses to have 
been completely insulated and misrepresented the roofs of 
the houses to have been 20 year roofs. 
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Defendants and appellants counterclaimed against the 
plaintiffs and respondents for breach of the following implied 
warranties: 
A. That the plaintiff and respondents as builders-ven-
dors irnpliedly warranted that the houses were con-
structed in a good and workmanlike manner and 
reasonably fit for occupancy as a place of abode, and 
that suitable and proper materials were used therein. 
B. That the plaintiffs and respondents as builders-ven-
dors impliedly warranted that the houses constructed 
by them were constructed in accordance with the 
building code of the area in which the structure is 
located. 
DISPOSITION OF THE TRIAL COURT 
The case was tried in the District Court of Weber Coun-
ty. The burden of going forward with the evidence was placed 
on the defendants and appeUants, since they had acknowl-
edged that the Uniform Real Estate Contract had been 
signed by them, and that a balance was due thereunder. 
Following the presentation of the defendants and appel-
lants case the trial court granted plaintiffs' and respondents' 
motion to dismiss defendants' and appellants' defense and 
appeal based upon breach of implied warranties. The trial 
court permitted the defense of fraud to stand and to go to 
the jury. The jury found the issues in favor of the plaintiffs 
and respondents, and awarded judgment for the sum of 
$4,379.32, interest for $272.25, $867.91 attorney's fees, and 
court costs for $19.60. 
The trial court refused to grant defendants' and appel-
lants' requested jury instruction that the plaintiffs and re-
spondents were liable for breach of implied warranties. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
A BUILDER-VENDOR IMPLIEDLY WARRANTS 
TO A PURCHASER OF A NEW HOUSE THAT 
THE MA TE RIALS USED THEREIN ARE REA-
SON ABLE AND SUITABLE; THAT THE HOME 
WAS BUILT IN A WORKMANLIKE MANNER 
AND SUITABLE FOR HABITATION; AND THAT 
THE BUILDER-VENDOR HAS COMPLIED WITH 
THE BUILDING CODE OF THE AREA IN 
WHICH THE STRUCTURE IS LOCATED. 
The facts show that the plantiffs and respondents were 
not licensed contractors, that they had not made applica-
tion for a contractor's license nor had they taken any examin-
ations normally given to a contractor. Testimony by Mr. 
Tibbitts on cross examination. 
Q. Are you a licensed building contractor Mr. Tibbitts? 
A. No. (R123) 
Q. But you at no time made application for a contrac-
tor's license? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you take any examinations as a contractor? 
A. No. 
Q. Have you had any schooling as a contractor? 
A. No, I don't think so. I have had, I have worked 
with contractors and done all cement work and car-
penter work, took it in high school classes. (R124) 
The facts show that a building permit had been taken 
out for both houses in the name of Lawrence Lutz as con-
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tractor, Mr. Lutz testified he was not the contractor and 
knew nothing about the building permits and did not give 
Mr. Tibbitts authority to use his name as contractor. (See 
Def. exhibit S & 6) 
Testimony of Mr. Lutz, carpenter, by Mr. Hansen, on 
direct examination: 
Q. Mr. Lutz I show you a building permit, application 
made to Riverdale City, for Lot 7, the application 
permit lists your name as the contractor, Lawrence 
Contractor, 325 Chimes View Drive, Ogden, Utah. 
Were you the contractor for Lot No. 7. 
A. No sir. 
Q. Did you authorize Mr. Tibbitts to take this permit 
out in your name as a contractor? 
A. No sir. 
Q. Did you sign this permit? 
A. No sir. 
Q. I show you the writing on that permit and ask you 
to identify that. Is that your handwriting? 
A. No sir. 
Q. To your knowledge have you ever indicated your 
approval to Mr. Tibbits as a contmctor for this lot. 
A. No sir. 
Q. When did you first become aware that your name 
was listed as the contractor for Lot No. 7. 
A. 
Q. 
Right now. 
Mr. Lutz I show you an application for a building 
permit regarding Lot No. 8, and ask you again if 
your name 1s listed as the contractor, Lawrence 
s 
Lutz, 325 Chimes View Drive. Did you make this 
application? 
A. No sir. 
Q. Did you authorize anyone to make the application 
in your name? 
A. No sir. 
Q. Did yo1;1 authorize Mr. Tibbitts to make it in your 
name? 
A. No sir. (R15, R16) 
Mr. Tibbitts testified as follows on cross examination 
by Mr. Hansen: 
Q. Who went into the office. Did you go in and make 
application for the permits? 
A. I took them in but I don't remember of rnaking 
them out in there. I know I didn't make this out. 
Q. But you took them in. Is that correct? 
A. I think I did. 
Q. You had forms and took them in, were they blank 
forms when you took them in? 
A. They gave me the forms. 
Q. Did you fill in the name of Lawrence Lutz as con-
tractor? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you tell them he was the contractor? 
A. I don't remember. 
Q. Did you have permission from Mr. Lutz to make 
application for a building permit? 
A. No. Mr. Lutz told me he would do all the carpenter 
work on the houses. (R124, 125) 
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The facts further show that it is extremely questionable 
whether any inspections were made on the houses as they 
were constructed. The building permit for both lots do not 
show that any inspections were made by Riverdale City. (See 
Defendants exhibit 5 and 6). Mr. Lutz, the carpenter, tes-
tified as follows on direct examination by Mr. Hansen: 
Q. What experience, if any, can you recall regarding 
the inspections made on the electrical work, the elec-
trical wiring? 
A. Well, I don't recall any inspections ever being made, 
that I know of. 
Q. Can you recall anything that Mr. Tibbitts said re-
garding the electrical inspections? 
A. Well, I know at times that he made his own inspec-
tions. 
Q. 
A. 
How do you know that he made his own inspections? 
Well he told me that he did. , 
Q. What did he say? 
A. Well, he said I called in my inspections. I don't wait 
for the inspectors to come. 
Q. Did he laugh when he said? 
A. Right. (Emphasis Added) (R19) 
Mr. Lutz's testimony on re-cross by Mr. Handy: 
Q. That is what you used? 
A. One by eight, either one by eight or plywood meets 
the building code. 
Q. But this wasn't turned down by the inspector, was it? 
A. We had no inspectors. 
Q. You had no inspectors? 
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A. No. (Emphasis Added) 
Q. Do you know whether or not you had to have an 
inspector at that time? 
A. Well, I figured there should be. On all the other 
buildings I have always had building inspectors 
around. (R37) 
TESTIMONY AND FACTS CONCERNING THE 
QUALITY OF THE LUMBER USED IN THE 
HOUSES. 
The testimony clearly establish that the lumber used in 
the houses was green, poor quality, sub-standard lumber, and 
that as a result of the lumber, the walls twisted and curved 
like a "snake" and the beams cracked, bowed, and warped 
as they dried. 
The testimony of Mr. Lutz, the carpenter follows: 
(Direct examination by Mr. Hansen) 
Q. Are you a licensed contractor? 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. You did the carpentry work. 
A. I done the carpentry work, that is all. 
Q. What lumber was supplied by Mr. Tibbitts. 
(Objection) Mr. Handy 
(R16) 
THE COURT: Answer the question. What type of lumber. 
A. It was mostly utility and construction. It was all 
brought in here from Montana by the truck load. 
Q. How would you classify the lumber, Mr. Lutz, as 
an experienced carpenter? 
A. Well, any building code wouldn't accept it. 
(Emphasis Added) (R17) 
8 
On cross examination Mr. Lutz testified: 
Q. (By Mr. Handy) What do you mean by standard 
or better? 
A. Well, that means a better grade of lumber, free from 
knots and it has got strength to it. You figure the 
stress and the strength of your lumber for different 
things like joists and studdings and things like that 
that should be west coast fir in all houses, that is 
required. 
Q. This lumber that was used here, this was satisfac-
tory as far as you were concerned? 
.A Well, no, it wasn't as far as I am concerned. If I 
had been contracting it myself, I wouldn't have put 
that lumber in. (R2 5) 
Q. But you say this type of lumber has been used by 
you in other construction work and it has worked 
out satisfactory? 
A. Not in homes. 
Q. What kind of construction? 
A. It is good for barns and things like that. (R26) 
(Emphasis Added) 
Testimony of Harvey Hill, a licensed contractor, who 
testified that he had constructed over 200 houses: Direct 
examination by Mr. Hansen. 
Q. Now in the event that you have green lumber used 
in framing what results from that? 
A. Well, your lumber will warp pretty bad if it is quite 
green. 
Q. Does it warp immediately, or d:>es it take a period 
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of time? 
A. It takes a while. It takes a while for it to dry out. 
(R63) 
Q. What about the strength of green lumber. Can you 
describe what the strength would be? 
A. It is your utility grade, usually your utility grade 
has more knots in it and doesn't have the strength 
in that that you have in the better grade without so 
many knots. That is what takes the strength out of 
it, the straightness of it. 
Q. What happens when green lumber is placed m a 
building? What is the result? 
A. It will warp or sag or twist or bend. It will bend 
out of shape. 
Q. In your opinion, as you observed it, please describe 
the appearance of the carport as you observed it 
to be. 
A. The face board on the outside was a 2 x 8 it looked 
like, and it was warped, twisted quite a bit in several 
places and in several places it was split. The beams 
supporting it were twisted and also sagging quite a 
bit, I didn't check the span to know whether the 
span was greater than it should be or not, but it was 
right up to a maximum at least. 
Q. Did you have occasion to examine the siding on the 
brown house? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And what was your observation? 
A. They have used a rough sawn lumber which is used 
quite often, but is apparently quite green because 
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it was warped and cracked quite a bit. At least split 
open. (R64) 
Q. And also the exterior deck, on the white and the 
brown houses, did you examine those? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And what did your examination show there? 
A. For the deck, they had used, it looked like a utility 
grade, 2 x 6 flooring and it was split and warped a 
bit, and there is one place in particular where the 
flooring hadn't reached the next joist. It was loose. 
It had 4 x 4 posts supporting it that were twisted 
quite a bit. 
Q. And what did you observe at that time? 
A. These walls. 
MR. HANDY: I object to this, this is two and a half 
years, three years after the purchase of this home, prac-
tically. 
THE COURT: This is a circumstance the jury may 
consider. They decide what weight to give the testimony, 
if any, in view of the circumstances. (R59) 
A. The lumber used for studs in this bearing partition 
wall or all of the walls that I examined have warped 
quite severely. You c,an look down the wall and see 
quite a lot of bends. (R60) 
Q. What can you do with a broom handle pressed 
against the ceiling? 
A. Well, you could push it up and down, it was loose. 
There was no support on it at all. (R60) 
Q. Mr.Hill, did you have, while examining the house, 
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an occasion to notice the condition of the eaves 
around the house, or the facing board? 
A. I noticed the face board. I didn't notice underneath 
the eaves. The face board was warped, most of it 
that I looked at was warped. 
Q. Did you estimate the amount of the warpage on any 
of the corners? 
A. Of I would say the joint was opened up an inch and 
a half or two inches on the corners. (R67) 
(Emphasis Added) 
The testimony of Mr. Tibbitts regarding the lumber 
used in these houses and others that he constructed follows: 
Mr. Hansen, cross examination: 
Q. You say the first house you built out of the eight 
was built with used lumber? 
A. The first house, yes. 
Q. Where did you get the used lumber? 
A. I don't remember. 
Q. Was this good lumber or what quality was it? 
A. Well, we got as I remember most of it from Second 
Street. I bought a blarracks down at Second Street, 
one of these barracks that they had there, war bar-
racks down there and move it, had it moved out 
there and it had both ends out of it, and we had an 
east wind and it blew the barna,cks flat the first 
night it set there. I went out the next morning and 
it was blown flat. We tore it to pieces. That is 
where the lumber came from. (R125) 
Q. Was it kiln dried? 
A. No, they don't kiln dry any construction lumber or 
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fir lumber in the State of Montana, that I know of, 
and they have some awful big mills in Montana. It 
doesn't pay to kiln dry lumber because it chips it. 
It makes it worse and when lumber is nailed into a 
house and nailed in there properly it doesn't have 
to be perfectly dry. This lumber, no lumber is per-
fectly dry that is put into a house by a long ways. 
(R127) 
Q. What would cause beams like that to sag? 
A. Well, the only thing I could say that they were too 
long a stress for the material, they weren't heavy 
enough beams. (Rl28) 
Mr. Handy, on direct examination of Mr. Tibbitts: 
Q. And the other you used the same type of utility 
lumber. Is that correct? 
A. Well, it was the same kind of lumber, it was from 
Montana, and we had it cut down except a little that 
I cut mysel!j. (Emphasis Added) ( 113) 
Testimony of Mr. Rhuel Openshaw regarding the condi-
tion of the walls when the houses were first purchased and 
at the time of the trial: 
Direct e~amination by Mr. Hansen 
Q. Now as to the walls, then you found them to be 
quite straight and regular? 
A. That is right. Immediately after the purchase. 
Q. Now would you describe the condition of those walls 
as they exist today. 
A. Putting a straight edge across them, you will find 
bulges in the walls now of at least one inch. (R40) 
Q. Thank you, Your Honor. I apologize. In connection 
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with the walls of the brown house, will you please 
describe the appearance of those walls immediately 
after the purchase. 
A. They were similar to the walls in the white house 
' however they were of slightly different construction, 
but they appeared apparently straight at the time of 
purchase. 
Q. Will you describe the appearance today as you ob-
served them to be. 
A. They are in about the same condition as those in the 
white house. They have bows in and out and they 
are noticeable without straight edging. (R40) 
The testimony of the sub-standard construction and use 
of inferior quality materials throughout the house continues 
on and on and on. Reference will be made to specific testi-
mony to substantial other areas testified to during the trial, 
but on a more limited basis in order to shorten the length of 
this brief. 
FURNACE 
No claim is made that the furnace was not properly in-
stalled by the heating sub-contractor, but the testimony is 
unrefuted that plaintiffs and respondents because of their in-
experience constructed walls around the furnace after installa-
tion. This condition was extremely dangerous and caused the 
gas company to close the gas off until it was remedied. 
Testimony of Mrs. Openshaw (Direct examination, by 
Mr. Hansen) 
Q. Did you do anything to remedy the situation in order 
to have the gas turned back on? 
A. We had our son, in fact one of the houses we tore 
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a whole section bec1a.use we were told we didn't have 
enough air. 
Q. Did you do that in both houses? 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. Was the gas turned back on after you did that? 
A. Yes sir. (R76) 
Testimony of Harvey Hill, licensed contractor, (Direct 
examination by Paul Hansen) 
Q. What happens if the furnace does not have ventila-
tion. Is there any danger, what is the effect? 
A. Yes, it is dangerous. Usually the gas company won't 
hook it up, if you don't have it ventilated. It has to 
have ventilation or the flame will go out and the gas 
still be on. It is dangerous. 
Q. Then what would be the result without adequate 
ventilation? 
A. If the flame went out, you would have gas come into 
your room at least until the safety valve when the 
furnace took over, you would have gas coming into 
the room, and it could get enough to explode. 
(Emphasis Added) (R66) 
ELECTRICAL WORK 
Testimony of Mr. Lutz, carpenter, Direct examination 
by Paul M. Hansen. 
Q. During the time that you worked on the houses, did 
have an occasion to observe who put the electrical 
work in the houses? 
A. Well, he done most of the work because he was doing 
all of it. (R18) 
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Q. Mr. Tibbitts was doing the electrical work? 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. Can you recall anything that Mr. Tibbitts said 
regarding the electrical inspections? 
A. Well, I know at times that he made his own inspec-
tions. 
Q. How do you know that he made his own inspections? 
A. Well, he told me that he did. 
Q. What did he say? 
A. Well, he said I called m my inspections. I don't 
wait for the inspectors to come. (R19) 
Q. Are you f!amiliar with the grounds of the electrical 
boxes in the kitchens and bathrooms? 
A. Well, I remember when they came out to hook the 
power up, they rejected it, said he would have to 
have it grounded before they would hook it up, and 
he grounded it himself. I know in one house in par-
ticular, I don't know which one it was. Then he 
called in and they came out and hooked it up. 
Q. Who called in? 
A. Mr. Tibbitts. 
PAINTING 
(R32) 
Testimony of Mr. Lutz, carpenter, Direct examination 
by Paul Hansen. 
Q. What do you mean by oil and color? 
A. Well he mixed color in oil and finished the wood-' 
work, most of the woodwork. 
Q. What type of color was used. 
A. Well, it was brick coloring put in with oil. 
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Q. You mean cement coloring? 
A. Cement coloring and brick coloring. (R21) 
Cross examination of Mr. Lutz. 
Q. Now, what do you mean by oil and color? 
A. Well, linseed oil with color mixed in it to bring out a 
color on it. He experimented a lot on bringing out 
colors and especially on paneling and things like 
that. He experimented quite a lot on bringing out 
colors. 
ROOFS 
The testimony is uncontradicted thlat approximately one 
year after occupancy the roof's leaked and have leaked con-
tinually since that time. The testimony is also uncontradict-
ed that neither houses have gravel to protect the tar from the 
hot summer sun. One house does was painted with aluminum 
paint as a poor substitute. 
Testimony of Mr. Openshaw, Direct examination by Paul 
M. Hansen. 
Q. When did these first start? 
A. Approximately one year after purchase. 
Q. Did you try to do anything about the leaks? 
A. The first leak I was away at Seattle when it oc-
curred. My wife contacted Mr. Tibbitts who came 
over and he made an attempt to patch it. 
Q. Did you have any difficulty after that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. How soon after. 
A. Almost every rain storm since I have been up patch-
ing leaks. 
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Q. That is, Mr. Openshaw, has been over patching leaks. 
A. You mean Mr. Tibbits. 
Q. Mr. Tibbitts. Pardon me. (R43) 
A. He has never come over to patch a leak after that 
first attempt that I know of. 
Q. Are these leaks located in anyone particular room 
or location of the roof? 
A. No sir. 
Q. Where are they located? 
A. All over the roof. 
Q. Does the roof have gravel on it? 
A. No sir. (R44) 
Q. Does the brown house have gravel on the roof? 
A. No sir. (R45) 
Testimony of Mr. Harvey Hill, contractor, that gravel 
and mopping is necessary to keep a roof from checking and 
drying out. (Direct examination by Paul Hansen) 
Q. Then on top of the five layers of felt, what would 
you have? 
A. Then it should have been mopped and gravel put on 
to keep it from checking and drying out. (R63) 
AUTHORITIES 
There are numerous authorities including Prosser and 
Williston who have advocated the extension of implied war-
ranties to include the sale of real estate. 
Directly in point also are several recent cases from the 
Supreme Courts of Colorado, Washington, Oklahoma, Illinois, 
and others. These cases have imposed upon a builder vendor 
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of new houses an implied warranty that the houses were rea-
sonably constructed with reasonable workmanship and mater-
ials, and that the houses were constructed in accordance with 
the building code where they were located. Reference will 
be made to each case with citations therefrom. 
The Supreme Court of Colorado, January 20, 1964, in 
Carpenter vs. Donohoe, 388 P2nd 399, at page 402: 
"In 1931 a departure from the rule of caveat emptor 
in the purchase of a house was announced by a dictum 
in the case of Miller v. Cannon Hill Extates, Ltd., (1931) 
2 K.B. 113. It was said in that case that warranties 
would be implied in a house, purchased in the course of 
construction, that it was built in an efficient and work-
manlike manner and of proper materials and when finish-
ed would be fit for habitation. 
A number of states have followed the Miller doc-
trine. See citations in 'Glisan v. Smolenske, supra. In-
deed, this court in the Glisan case applied the implied 
warranty doctrine to a house which was nearly completed, 
aligning its views with Perry v. Sharon Dev. Co., Ltd., 
supra. 
We hold that the implied warranty doctrine is ex-
tended to include agreements between builders-vendors 
and purchasers for the sal1e of newly constructed build-
ings, completed at the time of contracting. There is an 
implied warranty that builder-vendors have complied 
with the building code of the area in which the structure 
is located. Where, as here, 1a home is the subject of sale, 
there are implied warranties that the home was built in 
workmanlike manner and is suitable for habitation. 
(Emphasis Added) 
The judgment is reversed with directions to rein-
state the second count of the amended complaint and to 
proceed thereafter in manner consonant with the views 
herein expressed." 
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In that case, see page 400, the Donohoes were com-
pelled by the trial court to elect at the conclusion of the evi-
dence whether they relied on fraud or warranties, the Dono-
hoes chose the former. In this case the defendants and ap-
pellants were required to base their defense on fraud, the 
trial court having dismissing the defense and counter claim 
based on implied warranties. 
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma, April 16, 1963, in 
Jones v. Gatewood, 381 P2nd 158, stated in a similar case 
the following: (page 15 9, 160) 
"Plaintiffs brought an action for damages a~ainst 
defendants on the theory of breach of two implied war-
ranties, one the warranty of fitness and the other war-
ranty that the house was constructed in a good and work-
manlike manner. 
In Hoye v. Century Builders, Inc., 52 W1ash.2d 830, 
3 2 9 P. 2 d 4 7 4, wherein Hoye agreed to purchase a lot 
from Century Builders and the latter agreed to construct 
a house thereon, the Supreme Court of Washington held 
that under the circumstances there was an implied war-
ranty the completed house would be fit for human habita-
tion and that the uniform current of decisional law was 
in accord. The court then said: 
"* * * The reason is nowhere better explained 
than by the King's Bench division in Miller v. Cannon 
Hill Estates, Ltd. ( 1931), 2 K.B. 113 in the following 
passage from the opinion in that case: 
" '* * * The position is quite different when 
you contract with a builder or with the owners of a build-
ing estate in course of development that they shall build 
a house for you or that you shall buy a house which is 
then in the course of erection by them. There the whole 
object, as both parties know, is that there shall be erected 
a house in which the intended purchaser shall come to 
live. It is the very nature and essence of the transaction 
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between the parties that he will have a house put up there 
which is fit for him to come into as a dwelling-house. It 
is plain that in those circumstances there is an implica-
tion of law that the house shall be reasonably fit for the 
purpose for which it is required, that is for human 
dwelling. * * *' " 
The case of Vanderschrier v. Aaron, 103 Ohio App. 
340 N.E.2d 819, had the same question involved as is 
before us in the instant case. It is said therein: 
"In the law of England, we find the rule to be that, 
upon the sale of a house in the course of erection, there 
is an implied warranty that the house will be finished in 
a workmanlike manner. Perry v. Sharon Development 
Co., Ltd., 4 All E.L.R. (1937) 390. 
"In this country, we have found but few cases bear-
ing on the question. We have found none in this state 
directly touching it. See cases cited in 'Right of Pur-
chaser in Sale of Defective House,' 4 Western Reserve 
Law Rev. 357. 
"In establishing the M.w for this case, we adopt the 
law pronounced in the English case cited supra. We be-
lieve it to be salutary and based upon sound legal reason-
ing.'' (Emphasis Added) 
We are of the belief that the above stated reasoning 
is valid and applicable herein. We approve the rule an-
nounced in the cited cases. For the reasons above set 
forth, we hold that the trial court committed no error 
in determining that plaintiff were entitled to recover 
damages against defendant on the theory of implied 
warranty. Affirmed." 
It is worthy of note that although the 1936 edition of 
Williston, Contracts, stated flatly that there are no implied 
warranties in the sale of real estate, the 1963 edition took 
quite a different approach. 7 Williston, Contracts U 926, 
926A 3d ed.1963). In this edition, Professor Jaeger pointed 
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out that although the doctrine of caveat emptor is still broadly 
applied in the realty field, some courts have inclined towards 
marking "an exception in the sale of new housing where the 
vendor is also the developer or contractor" since in such 
situation the purchaser "relies on the implied representation 
that the contractor possesses a reasonable amount of skill 
necessary for the erection of a house; and that the house will 
be fit for human dwelling." ~~926A, at p. 10. In concluding 
his discussion of the subject, the author remarked that "it 
would be much better if this enlightened approach were gen-
erally adopted with respect to the sale of new houses for it 
would tend to discourage much of the sloppy work and jerry-
building that has become perceptible over the years." t 936A, 
at p. 818; see also, Dunham, 37 Minn.L.Rev., at p. 125; 
Bearman, 14 Vand.L.Rev., at pp. 570-576; cf. Caporaletti v. 
A-F Corporation, 137 F. Supp., at p. 16. (Emphasis Added) 
An Illinois case, Weck v. A. M. Sunrise Construction Co., 
36 Ill. App. 2nd 383, 184 reaches the same conclusion. In the 
Weck case plaintiff entered into a real estate sale contract, 
and subsequent to that time defects occured in the plumbing, 
roof leaks in the bedroom, the kitchen cabinets were defective, 
doors were warped, and other defects. 
In sustaining the plaintiff's claim, the court referred to 
the holdings in the leading English case of Miller v. Cannon 
Hill Estates, Ltd., supra, and the pertinent American cases, 
that a contract to purchase a house under construction carries 
with it an implied warranty of reasonable workmanship and 
habitability which survives the deed. The court also referred 
to Professor Dunham's summation of the recent cases as im-
posing on the building vendor a duty, which continues beyond 
delivery of the deed, "to make the premises fit for the ordinary 
purposes for which the building is being constructed and if 
the sale is from a model there is a duty to make the building 
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sold conform to the model and to be reasonably fit for its 
ordinary purposes." Dunham, 37 Minn. L.Rev., at page 125. 
The doctrine of liability for breach of implied warranties 
has been extended to builder-vendors in tort cases also. The 
case of Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 207 A. 2nd 314, there 
the court stated at page 321: 
"When marketed products are defective and cause 
injury to either immediate or remote users, such manufac-
turers miay be held accountable under ordinary negligence 
principles (MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 
382, 111 N.E. 1050, L.R.A.1916F, 696 (Ct.App.1916)) 
as well as under expanding principles of warranty or 
strict liability. See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 
Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A. 2d 69, ES A.L.R.2d 1 (1960); 
Putnam v. Erie City Manufacturing Company, 338 F. 2d 
911 ( 5 Cir.1964) ; Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument 
Corporation, 12 N.Y.2d 432, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592, 191 N.E. 
2d 81 (Ct.App.1963); Greenman v. Yuba Power Pro-
ducts, Inc., 59 Cal.2d 57, 27 Cal.Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897 
Sup.Ct.1962); cf. Santor v. A. & M. Kariagheusian, Inc., 
43 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965). The plaintiffs urge 
that the MacPherson principle, imposing liability for neg-
ligence, should be applied to a builder vendor such as 
Levitt. We consider their point to be well taken for it is 
clear to us that the impelling policy considerations which 
led to MacPherson and its implementations are equally 
applicable here. See Foley v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines 
Co., 363 Pa. 1, 68 A.2d 517, 533 Sup.Ct.1949); Dow v. 
Holly Manufacturing Company, 49 Cal.2d 720, 321 P.2d 
736 (Sup.Ct.1958); Fisher v. Simon, 15 Wis.2d 207, 112 
N.W.2d 705 (Sup.Ct.1961); Leigh v. Wadsworth, 361 
P.2d 849 (Okla.Sup.Ct.1961); cf. Inman v. Binghamton 
Housing Authority, 1 A.D.2d 559, 152 N.Y.S.2d 79 
(1956), rev'd. 3 N.Y.2d 137, 164 N.Y.S.2d 699, 143 
N.E.2d 895, 898-899, 59 A.L.R.2d 1072 (Ct.App.1957); 
Pastorelli v. Associated Engineers, Inc., 176 F.Supp. 159, 
164 (D.R.I.1959); Caporaletti v. A-F Corporation, 137 
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F.Supp. 14 (D.D.C.1956), rev'd, 99 U.S.App.D.C. 367, 
240 F.2d 53 D.C.Cir.1957); Prosser, supra, t 99, at p. 
695." 
Dean Prosser in his second edition ,placed building con-
tractors on the same footing as sellers of goods, and had held 
them to the general standard of reasonable care for the pro-
tection of anyone who might forseeably be endangered by 
their negligence, even after acceptance of the work. Prosser, 
Torts t 85, at p. 517 (2d ed. 1955). In Dean Prosser's more 
recent edition he noted that the reasons which had earlier 
been advanced against holding general contractors liable in 
negligence actions by third persons were reminiscent of those 
which had been advanced in actions against manufacturers of 
goods and had been rejected in MacPherson; and he conclud-
ed that the earlier approach is now in full retreat and that the 
majority rule now imposes responsibilty to third persons for 
negligence "not only as to contractors doing original construc-
tion work, but also as to those doing repair work or installing 
parts, as well as supervising engineers and architects." Pros-
ser, supra, at p. 695 ( 3d ed.1964). 
POINT II 
ARE THE DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS 
DENIED THEIR CLAIM OF BREACH OF IM-
PLIED WARRANTIES BY REASON OF THE FOL-
LOWING PROVISION CONTAINED IN THE UNI-
FORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT: 
"Buyer accepts the said property in its ,present condition 
and that there are no representations, covenants or agree-
ments between the parties hereto with reference to said 
property except as herein specifically set forth or at-
tached hereto." 
The above provision appears to cover two areas. 
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A. "Buyer accepts the said property in its present condition, 
AND" 
B. "that there are no representations, covenants, or agree-
ments between the parties hereto with reference to said 
property except as herein specifically set forth or at-
tached." 
PART A: "In its present condition" has generally been in-
terpretated to mean "as is". 46 Am Jur, sales, "as is" para-
graph 319, page 501, states, that implied warranties are ex-
cluded when sales are made "as is", HOWEVER, THE 
CASES THERE CITED REFER TO THE SALES OF OLD 
OR USED PROPER TY, and do not ref er to the sales of a 
new home constructed by the seller for the buyer. 
Attention should also be given to the intent of the parties. 
Did the buyers of the property in question intend to buy a 
newly constructed home "as is"? Obviously that was not 
their intent. When one party deals with and relies on the 
experience and skill of a builder-vendor he is not buying the 
house "as is", and the builder-vendor is not intending to sell 
a newly constructed house, "as is". 17 Am. Jur 2nd page 654, 
paragraph 2 5 7, states: 
"It is a general rule that contracting parties are presumed 
to contract in reference to the existing law; INDEED 
THEY ARE PRESUMED TO HAVE IN MIND ALL 
THE EXISTING LAWS RELATING TO THE CON-
TRACT, OR TO THE SUBJECT MATTER THERE-
OF. Thus it is commonly said that all existing applicable 
or relevent and valid statutes, ordinances, regulations, 
and settled law of the land at the time a contract is made 
become a part of it and must be read into it." 
17 Am. Jur. 2nd, para. 257 (Citing numerous cases) 
(Emphasis Added) 
It is the position of the Appellants and defendants that 
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there was an implied warranty at the time of the sale of the 
newly constructed houses, that they were constructed in ac-
cordance with the existing building ordinances and codes of 
the area where they were built and that the materials used 
therein complied with the building ordinances and codes. 
A sale of property "as is" does not exclude all implied 
warranties or express warranties. 77 CJS, ,para. 317 page 
1168, states: 
"Sales of property "as is" generally exclude implied 
warranties, and the buyer takes the property in its then 
existing condition without warranty as to quality or fit-
ness for a particular purpose. It has BEEN HELD, , 
HOWEVER, THAT THE SELLER IS NOT RE-
LIEVED OF ALL WARRANTIES." See Maddox v. 
Katz, 8 So. 2nd 749, and other cases cited therein. 
The situation and facts of the present case are unique. 
The plaintiffs-respondents have sub-divided property and are 
constructing houses for sale to the public. They are holding 
themselves out as experienced, capable, com,petent, and trained 
contractors upon whom the defendants have a right to rely. 
To permit a builder-vendor in that situation to sell "as is" 
without regard for the building ordinances, building codes, or 
other protective devices, adopted not only by the various city 
counsels but also by the State of Utah, would permit him to 
defraud the public with impunity. 
Surely, there would be no purpose in the careful con-
siderations given to the adoption of building codes and ordi-
nances if a builder-vendor could so EASILY nulify their ef-
fect. How and where is the protection afforded to the public? 
17 Am Jur 2nd, page 710, paragraph 293: 
"Im1plied warranties, although they are consensual in 
the sense that they presuppose that the parties have en-
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tered into some kind of contract, are not promises by the 
warrantor that the fact warranted is true; they are 
"OBLIGATIONS" IMPOSED IN INVITUM AS A 
CONSEQUENCE OF MAKING THE CONTRACT 
' REGARDLESS OF THE WARRANTOR's INTENT." 
It is extremely interesting to note that Mr. Tibbitts, the 
plaintiff and respondent in this case, an inexperienced, un-
qualified, poorly trained, "do it yourself er" contractor has 
been the main reason for many changes and additions to the 
building code and sub-division ordinances adopted by the City 
of Riverdale. Will the courts then permit Mr. Tibbitts to 
by-pass these ordinances by means of an "l:ts is" provision. 
Cross examination of Mr. Tibbitts. 
Q. You haven't had any trouble with Riverdale City, 
have you? 
A. No. 
Q. They didn't pass their sub-division clause because of 
you, did they? 
A. No. No it was time for, those times, well I guess 
anyway I sold about seventy lots in there to con-
tractors so I guess anyway THEY DID PASS IT 
ON ACCOUNT OF ME. Let's face it. When you 
start building they do pass new laws to keep up with 
it. (Emphasis added) (R131) 
PART B: This provision applies to oral or written agree-
ments other than those contained in the written contract. It 
would cover express warranties. This part of the provision 
does not, however, expressly disclaim implied warranties. 
See 77 CJS para. 317, page 1166, 1167, 1168, where it 
is pointed out th'at a disclaimer of express warranties does not 
exclude implied warranties. 
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"A refusal of express warranties does not exclude implied 
warranties." page 1166, 77 CJS, supra, paragraph 317, 
also see page 1167, ''It has been held that the mere state-
ment that an express contract contains the entire agree-
ment or all the agreements of the parties does not prevent 
the existence of implied warranties not excl<uded by that 
expressed.' 
The second part of the provision does not prevent the 
showing of fraud in the inducement. Many and many cases 
have held that on the grounds of public policy and morality 
a party is not precluded by such a provision from showing 
fraud. See, 17 Am Jur 2nd para. 191, page 560, citing numer-
ous cases to support. 
POINT III 
THE VERDICT OF THE JURY IS NOT SUPPORT-
ED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
The evidence quoted throughout this brief as well as m 
the record clearly shows that the plaintiffs respondents in-
tended to defraud the defendants and appellants. That they 
deliberately and intentionally used inferior m1aterials, which 
did not meet the specifications of the building code; that the 
roof installed was misrepresented to the defendants and ap-
pellants and that they misrepresented the insulation in the 
houses, representing them to be "fully insulated." 
CONCLUSION 
The trend is and has been for a number of years to 
depart from the doctrine that implied warranties do not ex-
tend to the sale of real estate. Neighboring states such as 
Colorado, Oklahoma, Washington, and others have imp0sed 
liability upon builder vendors for breach of implied warran-
ties. The State of Colorado in a 1964 case, Oarpenter v. 
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Donohoe, held that the implied warranty doctrine is extended 
to include agreements between builder-vendors and purchasers 
for the sale of newly constructed buildings, completed at the 
time of contracting. There is an implied warranty that builder-
vendors have complied with the building code of the area in 
which the structure is looated. Where as here, a home is the 
subject of sale, there are implied warranties that the home 
was built in workmanlike manner and is suitable for habita-
tion. 
If point number 1 is followed should the court then per-
mit a builder vendor to avoid, disregard, circumvent, ignore 
local and state building ordinances adopted to protect the 
public, by inserting an "as is" provision in the sale of new 
homes. It would seem that public policy certainly would not 
be promoted if that were the case. 
trial. 
The court should, therefore, reverse and order a new 
Re~pectfully submitted, 
PAUL M. HANSEN 
817 OAK DRIVE 
SOUTH OGDEN, UTAH 
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